Abstract. In 2002, Murphy and Robshaw introduced an extension BES of AES and argued this could compromise the security of AES. We introduce here two block-ciphers CES and Big-BES that are some extensions of the AES and BES respectively in the spirit of Hensel lifting extensions. They are defined similarly to the AES respectively BES except that every operations are performed in a ring structure including the field GF (2 8 ). We show that the AES and BES can be embedded in their extensions. More precisely, by restricting these extensions on a given subset, we obtain a fully equivalent description of the AES and BES. Furthermore, we show that these natural extensions are trivially weak by describing a cryptanalysis of them despite it leads to no consequence about the security of AES or BES. This shows that (except the nice mathematical construction) the Murphy-Robshaw extension might be pointless.
Introduction
Since the publication of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), many attempts have been performed to find some security flaws in its design. It is wellknown that the AES resists to some classical attacks such as the linear cryptanalysis [9] and the differential cryptanalysis [3] . Recently, the attention of some researchers has focused on some new ideas based on algebraic concepts [1, 2, 5, 7, 11] . This is particularly due to the fact that the S-box of the AES is algebraic.
The block-cipher BES has been proposed by Sean Murphy and Matthew J.B. Robshaw in Crypto 2002 [11] . BES has a 128 bytes message space and key space and can be regarded as an extension of the 128 bits version of the AES. Namely, by restricting BES on a special subset of the state space, we obtain a cipher that is fully equivalent to the AES. One of the advantages of BES is to describe the AES with basic operations in GF (2 8 ). Recently, people investigated the implication of an other extension type (the Hensel lifting) in public key cryptography (Okamoto-Uchimaya [13] , Catalano et al. [4] ). It was demonstrated that some extensions are indeed weak. Similar ideas were used in order to solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem on the elliptic curves of trace one, see Smart [15] and Satoh [14] . Here we demonstrate that symmetric-key cryptography have similar properties.
In this paper, we introduce an extension of BES called Big-BES by replacing the underlying field GF (2 8 ) by a commutative ring R in which GF (2 8 ) can be embedded in a very natural way. We show also that restricting Big-BES on some subsets of the state vector space provides a cipher fully equivalent to BES. Using some linear properties occurring in Big-BES, we can cryptanalyze it quite efficiently. We also apply a similar construction to the AES by defining the blockcipher CES and show that CES can be broken by an identical cryptanalysis. From this work, we can deduce first that replacing the underlying field by a similar structure can have a destructive impact on the security of a block-cipher even if this one is an extension. Secondly, despite of an efficient cryptanalysis, this leads to no consequence about the security of BES and AES. So, it seems that a natural extension of AES such as BES may be weak without compromising the security of AES. This comes from the strong properties required to the extensions of a given cipher e.g. AES.
In section 2 we recall the descriptions of AES and BES. Section 3 is devoted to the introduction of Big-BES that we cryptanalyze in section 4. We adapt this work to AES in section 5 by defining a new block-cipher called CES. Then, section 6 contains a discussion of the choice of the extension of the field GF (2 8 ). Finally, section 7 concludes this article.
Background on AES and BES
The operations involved in AES and BES are essentially performed in the fi-
, where p is the following irreducible polynomial p(X) = X 8 +X 4 +X 3 +X +1. A byte will be then considered as an element of F and a plaintext of AES resp. BES will be an element of F 16 resp. F 128 .
Inversion. In the two ciphers, we use an inversion map that is defined as the normal inversion in F for non-zero elements and that maps zero to itself, i.e. for a ∈ F we have
For a vector b of a space F n , b (−1) means a componentwise inversion, i.e.
The AES Structure
In this subsection, we recall roughly the structure of the AES and we will provide a description in which all operations are performed in the field F. We consider here the 128 bits version with 10 rounds and we omit the key schedule. For a detailed version of the AES, we refer the reader to FIPS-197 [12] and the book of Daemen and Rijmen [6] .
AES is a block cipher that consists in an iteration of some round transformations on the plaintext. The plaintext, the subkeys and the ciphertext are some elements of the state space A := F 16 of the AES. Except for an initial subkey addition and the last round, all the rounds are of the following form:
Round of AES. We denote the input of the round as x = (x 1 , · · · , x 16 ) ∈ F 16 . We describe the successive transformations performed in the round below. 
where L A is a fixed 8 × 8-matrix with GF (2) elements. In [11, 6] , it is shown that we can express L A in F with the linearized polynomial
3. ShiftRows and MixColumns. The vector state is transformed by two functions called ShiftRows resp. MixColumns. In [11] , it is shown that each of these operations corresponds to a matrix multiplication. Indeed, this step consists in the following computation z → Mix A · R A · z, where z ∈ F 16 is the input of this step and Mix A , R A are two fixed (16 × 16) F-matrices. For more details we refer again to [11] . 4. AddRoundKey. Finally, the last operation of the round is simply a subkey addition, i.e. an addition in F 16 .
Remark. We notice that the AES S-Box is composed of the step 1 and 2. This transformation performed in the S-Box is called SubBytes. We have omitted a constant addition in the S-Box for sake of simplicity because it can be incorporated in a modified key schedule (see [11, 10] ). We also remark that the structure of the AES is composed of simple operations in F (such as inversions, linear operations) except for the evaluation of the linearized polynomial q. By extending the state space such that the conjugates can be included, the polynomial q can be represented by a matrix on F. Using this fact, S. Murphy and M. Robshaw [11] introduced the cipher BES in order to express the AES in a very simple form.
The BES Structure
The block-cipher BES is defined on the state space B := F 128 and has a similar structure to the AES one. We describe it below.
Round of BES. One round of the BES is essentially an affine transformation except a componentwise inversion. We can describe it as follows (using notation of [11] ) :
where b ∈ B denotes the state vector, (k B ) i ∈ B denotes the i th -subkey and M B a 128 × 128-matrix on F.
BES encryption. Let p ∈ B be the plaintext, c ∈ B the ciphertext, w i (0 ≤ i ≤ 10) the state vector after the i th round and (k B ) i ∈ B (0 ≤ i ≤ 10) the 11 subkeys. The BES encryption can be described as follows:
where M * B is a 128 × 128-matrix on F. Then, the encryption is composed only of the round described above except for an initial addition key and a different matrix in the last round.
The key motivation of BES is that a given vector space V of dimension 16 (on F) is stable by BES as long as the key lies in a similar vector space and that the cipher BES restricted to V is isomorphic to AES.
Big-BES

Extension of F
Our extension that we define below was inspired by the same way the ring of the p-adic integers extends Z/pZ. We consider here an analog extension in which we keep only the two first terms of the "F-adic extension". To this end, we simply take F × F such that computations on the first coordinate corresponds to regular F-operations. Hence, we choose the set R := F × F equipped with the componentwise addition
and the following multiplication:
From this definition, we notice that (R, +, ·) is a commutative ring with the unit element (1, 0) and that the multiplicative inverse of an invertible element (x, y) ∈ R is given by (x, y)
Thus, no element of the form (0, y) is invertible and R is not a field. Since defining Big-BES requires to modify the inversion in a permutation on R, we use the following inversion map:
We notice that every operation performed on the first component of an element of R is the same as in F. Hence, the field F is embedded in R via the first component. Moreover, R is a F-vector space and its scalar multiplication by λ ∈ F corresponds to a multiplication in R by (λ, 0).
Remark. If we fix the x-component in R and if x = 0, the inverse operation is linear with respect to the y-component. Remark. R corresponds to F[X]/(X 2 ), i.e. polynomials over F truncated to the first two terms.
Definition of the Big-BES
Here we introduce a block cipher called Big-BES that is defined on B := R 128 and that is an extension of BES, i.e. in which BES is embedded. First, we will consider the most general case and then we will look for an appropriate way to embed BES in the Big-BES.
The Big-BES is essentially obtained by replacing the field F by the ring R = F × F and using the trivial embedding e : F → R defined by
The rounds of Big-BES are defined exactly as for BES except that the operations are performed in R and that we replace the elements of the matrix M B by their images under the trivial embedding e, i.e.
In a similar way, we define the matrix M * Big ∈ R 128×128 . So, the Big-BES is defined as follows:
where the plaintext p, the ciphertext c, the intermediate vectors w i 's and the subkeys (k Big ) j 's are in B, the state space of Big-BES. Obviously, Big-BES is the natural extension of BES where F is replaced by R.
Embedding BES in Big-BES
Let Φ : B → B that acts on each F-component applying the function e. This function maps the subkeys and the plaintext of BES in a subset B E of B such that a BES encryption can be described by a Big-BES encryption restricted on B E . Hence, the following diagram
commutes. This condition is necessary to ensure that a Big-BES encryption on B E really corresponds to a BES encryption. More generally, we can replace e by a function F defined by F (x) = (x, c · x), for a constant c ∈ F. Even with this generalisation the diagram (6) still commutes. Thus, we have
So, we have found a restriction of Big-BES that consists more or less to duplicate BES. It seems to be clear that such a restriction has the same security properties as BES.
Attack on Big-BES
A Detailed Description of Big-BES
In this subsection, we will describe Big-BES in more details by writing the ciphertext in an expression depending on the subkeys and the plaintext. In order to simplify the notation, we will denote the subkeys as k i ∈ B for i = 0, . . . , 10 and the matrices M B resp. M * B as M resp. M
* . An element of B = R 128 will be represented by two elements of F 128 , for instance
Then, we will represent the plaintext with the pair (x, y), the vectors w i with (u i , v i ) (i = 0 . . . 10) and the ciphertext (u 10 , v 10 ) with (u c , v c ). Now, we would like to describe u i and v i in some expressions depending on (x, y) and ((k i ) 1 , (k i ) 2 ). To this end, we first notice that the matrix multiplication M Big · b, b ∈ B, can be simply computed as follows,
128 . Namely, since every elements of M Big is the image under the trivial embedding of the elements of M B , we see that such a matrix multiplication operates identically on the two F 128 -components of b. An other important operation in Big-BES is the componentwise inversion of the vectors w i , (0 ≤ i ≤ 10). In the description of Big-BES, we will suppose here that u i has no elements of F equal to zero. Hence, we have
where · denotes the componentwise multiplication.
We are now in a position to describe the vectors u i , v i . Firstly, for i = 0 we have obviously
and after the first round we obtain
We remark that the vectors v i are obtained by iterating some affine functions depending on the subkeys and x. So, we can write v c in the following form
where A i are some matrices depending on the subkeys (k j ) 1 , (0 ≤ j ≤ 9) and x. They are defined such that
for all p ∈ F 128 . Since the componentwise multiplication with the vectors u j can be represented by the diagonal matrix diag(u j ), we have
In order to finish our description of Big-BES, it remains only to express the u i 's as some functions of x and the subkeys (k i ) 1 . This is given by noticing that the u i 's are the intermediate state vectors of a BES encryption taking x as plaintext and (k i ) 1 as subkeys. Thus, we have
and finally, we have expressed the ciphertext (u c , v c ) as a function of the plaintext (x, y) and the subkeys (
Remark. If we fix x the first component of the plaintext and if we consider the subkeys as some fixed parameters, we notice from (8) that v c , the second component of the ciphertext is simply given by the affine transformation
where A ∈ F 128×128 and r ∈ F 128 are some constants. However, this representation works under the assumption that the u i 's (0 ≤ i ≤ 9) have no component equal to zero. Actually, this assumption is quite strong, because it concerns 10 · 128 = 1280 elements of F. Namely, the probability that all these elements are not equal to zero is 255 256
The Attack
The attack we will describe below is a chosen plaintext attack and it exploits the fact that Big-BES possesses certain linearity properties we already mentioned above. In fact, if we fix x we know that the second component of the ciphertext is affine in y if there is no 0-inversion in the vectors u i (0 ≤ i ≤ 9). It is not difficult to see that this affine property depends only on x, once the subkeys are fixed. The idea of our attack will be to collect sufficiently many x's such that the affine property is verified. From this, we will be able to find the subkeys (k i ) 1 by a sieving method.
The affine property. Here, for a given x, we show how we can check the affine property, i.e, that no 0-inversion occurred in the u i . We consider here a Big-BES encryption with some given fixed subkeys, two plaintexts of the form (x, y), (x, y ) and their corresponding ciphertexts (u, v), (u, v ). By applying the equality (10) for the two above plaintexts, we have
Since the underlying field is of characteristic two, r + r = 0 and we obtain
by adding (12) with (13) . Hence, we notice that the sum v + v is constant when y + y is constant. To determine if the affine property holds for a given x, we will encrypt 4 plaintexts of the form (x, y), (x, y ), (x, y ) and (x, y + y + y ) and check that the corresponding ciphertexts satisfy
Hence, we should be able to conclude that no 0-inversion occurred in the Big-BES encryption with this x. Notice that the inversion of the form (0, 0) (−1) = (0, 0) preserves the linearity and that some bad x could pass the test. However, since this should occur for 4 plaintexts, we will assume that the probability of such an event is negligible.
The attack. In this attack, we assume that we have a Big-BES encryption oracle that allows to encrypt any plaintexts. The goal is to find the subkeys used in this Big-BES encryption. We describe below the different steps of this attack.
We pick some vectors x ∈ F
128 at random and check if the affine property holds for each of them by using our oracle to encrypt the plaintexts (x, y) needed to this end. Then, we collect the x's that satisfied the affine property. The set of these collected vectors is denoted as
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. If this subkey element is not uniquely determined by the set P , we can look for some new x ∈ P that allows us to exclude some values of (k 0 ) i 1 . All these new x s are collected in P too. At the end of this step, we can deduce the value of the subkey (k 0 ) 1 .
3.
For every x i ∈ P , we compute u 0i = x i + (k 0 ) 1 and we collect all the vectors M · u
in a set denoted as P 1 . Again, we know that the subkey element (k 1 ) i 1 can be deduced as above by the statement
If it is needed, we can complete the set P 1 with new appropriate vectors in order to find the right subkey (k 1 ) 1 . 4. We continue the same process by computing some successive sets P j , (2 ≤ j ≤ 9) and by using the same sieving method as above to find the subkeys (k 1 ) j , (2 ≤ j ≤ 9). 5. We pick an element x ∈ F 128 and compute its corresponding ciphertext u 10 by the encryption oracle. The already known subkeys allow us to calculate u 9 and the subkey (k 1 ) 10 is found by the equality
+ u c .
6. Since the subkeys (k 1 ) i 's are known, we can now compute the matrices A i 's corresponding to any plaintext (x, y) by using the formula (9) . By choosing many plaintexts (x, y) and computing the corresponding matrices A i 's and the corresponding ciphertext v 10 , we can find a sufficient number of linear equations taking the subkeys (k 2 ) i 's as variables. Namely, applying the linear equation (8) to many different plaintexts provide a linear system allowing to determine the (k 2 ) i 's.
Complexity. Here we estimate roughly the number of Big-BES encryptions required to this attack. The biggest amount of computations is required for collecting the elements x ∈ P 9 satisfying the affine property. To find each of those x, we have to try 150 candidates in average (11) with which we need to compute 4 encryptions to test the affine property. We estimate in the Appendix A that P 9 contains about 2100 elements. Thus, we conclude that 150·2100·4 = 1 260 000 ≈ 2 20 encryptions have to be calculated. This demonstrates that Big-BES is terribly weak.
Implications for BES. As we have seen in (6), breaking BES corresponds to breaking Big-BES on the restricted set B E . From this, we remark that our attack against Big-BES can not be applied against BES. Indeed, this is due to the fact that all 0-inversions in B E are of the form (0, 0) −1 = (0, 0).
CES
In this section we will construct a similar extension to AES called CES as for " Crooked Encryption System ". This extension is natural in the sense that the Murphy-Robshaw-like extension of CES is indeed Big-BES, so that we have a kind of commutative extension diagram
Definition
As for Big-BES, CES is defined on the commutative ring R with the operations defined by (2) , (3), (4) . This extension is obtained by replacing the field F by the ring R and by mapping the constant elements of the AES defined on F under the trivial embedding (5). This concerns the elements of the matrices MIX A and R A and the coefficients of the polynomial q of equation (1). These two new matrices will be denoted as MIX C resp. R C . Hence, CES is a cipher having the state space R 16 and a round has the form:
Round. Let b ∈ R 16 a state vector. Then the i th round is
where M C = MIX C · R C , (k C ) i denotes the i th subkey and the polynomial q operates componentwise. Note that the 0-round is simply a subkey addition and the 10 th is obtained by replacing M C by another matrix.
The Embedding
As in Section 3.3, we notice that e embeds AES in CES quite well since q(e(x)) = e(q(x)).
Attack against CES
Here we show that the attack in the subsection 4.2 can be easily adapted to CES. We will use the same principle that allows to detect a 0-inversion in F. In order to show this fact, we have still to check that CES transforms the second component of a plaintext linearly when the first component is fixed. First, we note that q(x, y) = (q(x), 05 · y), where x, y ∈ F 16 and q operates componentwise on the 16 components of R 16 resp. F 16 . Hence, a CES encryption is linear in y when x is fixed, therefore we can apply the same attack consisting in checking a linear property for some given x. Notice also that the first component is transformed as in an AES encryption.
Complexity. For the complexity estimation of this attack, we need to compute the ratio of the plaintexts for which no 0-inversion occur in a CES-encryption. This is given by 255 256
160
= 0.5346 = 1 1.87
Hence, we have to encrypt 1.87 plaintexts in average until we find the required one for the step 1 of the attack. Thus, the number of CES encryptions needed for this cryptanalysis is 1.87 · 1850 · 4 = 13 838 ≈ 2 14 (See Appendix A) .
Implications for the AES. As in the BES case, this attack can not be applied against AES. Namely, the embedding function e induces only 0-inversions of the form (0, 0) −1 .
Discussion about Extending Block Ciphers
In this paper, we constructed some extensions of AES and BES by replacing the field F by a natural extension of it. The first natural extension we thought was inspired by the p-adic numbers. So, we considered formal sums
where (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , ) ∈ F N . To simplify such expressions, we chose to define our extension by taking the projection modulo 4 of these formal sums. This equivalently consists of terms of the form x 0 + 2 · x 1 where x 0 , x 1 ∈ F. In this structure, we remark that the inversion has the desired property, namely this operation is linear in x 1 when we fix x 0 . This led to the fact that a new BES like block-cipher defined on this ring is weak. Indeed, the attack applied in 4.2 could easily be adapted to this case provided that we define the inversion of an element of the form 0 + 2 · x 1 similarly as in (4) . Nevertheless, it turns out that the calculations are a little bit more complicated than in R. As a conclusion, we would like to mention that there are probably some other extensions of F presenting similar properties, but R seemed to be one of the simplest and most appropriate.
So, we have shown that several natural extensions for AES and BES are weak. Note that this kind of extension can typically be used in order to prevent from some power analysis or other side channel attacks. Our result demonstrate that this should be done with extreme care.
